




(Continued from May No., ante, p. 289.)
(Apnerican decisions modifying the English doctrine as to the exclusivs
power of superior courts at common law over contempts.)
To make clear the grounds of the departure to a greater or less
extent in several states from the strict English rule previously (i1s-
cussed, it is well to advert to the differences between the English
system of courts and that generally established in this country at
the epoch of its separation from the mother country.
Although the Court of King's Bench had precedence over all
other courts, being held coram rege, and could issue a certiorari to
any of them (Com. Dig. Certiorari, A. 1), yet the other courts
of Westminster Hall were of nearly equal dignity. The courts of
Westminster Hall, the King's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer
and Court of Chancery, with the House of Lords, constituted, ac-
cording to Bac. Abr. (Courts D.), the "more principal superior
courts ;" from the necessity of the case their power over contempts
was exclusive, and although this power belonged to all the superior
courts, the principle of its exclusiveness was established with refer-
ence to these courts and the two houses of parliament. This is
evident from the language of 'the English cases above commented
on, also Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East 1, and others, where the power
of the House of Commons was called in question.
BLACKSTONE, J., in his opinion in the Lord Mayor's Case, con-
fines himself to these courts; the distinction between them and
other superior courts is strongly dwelt on in the argument in .Re
Vor. 1XIX.-46 (361)
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Fernandez (10 Com. B. N. S. 3), and adverted to in the opinion of
COCKBURN, C. J., in Beg. v. Lefroy, Law Rep., 8 Q. B. 134; 4
Moak 250. See also Williamson's Case, 26 Penn. St. 25, 28.
No order of courts like those of Westminster Hall ever existed
in this country. In each state there was created one, or, where a
separate equity system had been established, two courts of last
resort, which took the place of the King's Bench and Court of
CLancery in England, and which had a superintending jurisdicti-m
over all other courts.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under the Act of 1722,
had the powers of the common-law courts of Westminster Hall.
GIBSON, C. J., in Oommonwealth v. Beaumont, 4 Rawle 366.
Failing the most cogent reason of the English rule, in some
states, as in Pennsylvania, it was no longer observed, though in
the majority, as shown above, it was still adhered to; and in Penn-
sylvania the courts reverted to it when conditions like the English
prevailed, and a commitment by one superior court, independent
and co-ordinate, was brought before another, as happened in Pass-
more Williamson's Case, 26 Penn. St. 9, supra, where the Su-
preme Court refused a writ of habeas corpus, for one committed by
the United States District Court, recognising the difference between
their power in regard to commitments made by state courts, and
that under consideration: pp. 17, 23, 25, 28. Though BLACK, J.,
was evidently of opinion that the case before them, coming upon
an application for a habeas corpus, the result would have been the
same had the commitment been by a subordinate state court: pp.
17, 20.
The two principal cases which settled the law of Pennsylvania
until the decision in Ex parte Steinman, infra, as to the power of
revision of sentence for contempt by superior courts, are Hummel
and Bishoff's Case, 9 Watts 416 (1840), and Commonwealth v.
.NeVton, 1 Grant 453 (1857).
The first of these came up into the Supreme Court on writ of error
to a Court of Common Pleas, the propriety of which was not ques-
tioned, though the court considered a writ of certiorari the appro-
priate mode of bringing the matter before it. The court below had
fined the plaintiffs in error for contempt, and from this judgment
a writ of error was taken. SERGEANT, J.' delivering the opinion
of the court, declared that the Act of June 16th 1836, relative
to contempts of court, had made "no change in the juris-
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diction of the Supreme Court so far as respects its superin-
tendence over the proceedings of inferior courts," (citing the
opinion of GIBSON, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Beaumont, 4
Rawle 366, as to the previous powers of the court under the Act
of 1722, in which he says it had all those possessed by the King's
Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer at Westminster), and shows
"that it exercised a general superintending jurisdiction over the
proceedings of inferior tribunals, whether proceeding by the course
of the common law or where they are summary or not before a
court of record." * * * "If this be so in civil proceedings,
there is still stronger reason why the proceedings by an inferior
tribunal, for a contempt of court, should be subject to the
revisory power of this court, to see that they have not over-
stepped their jurisdiction and exercised this summary power
in a case not warranted by the laws. For this is always ranked
as a criminal proceeding, and the general common-law rule
is, that a certiorari lies from the King's Bench to remove all
criminal proceedings of an inferior court, unless there be a
special exemption, or unless where, after conviction, the party is
put to his writ of error: 2 Hawk. P. C. 406, 408. The object of
the removal is not to inquire into the merits of the case, but to
ascertain whether the court had jurisdiction and exercised it ac-
cording to law." It was held that the persons committed were
officers of the court, while in the execution of their office as county
commissioners, that the court below had jurisdiction, and that its
proceedings were regular; the judgment was affirmed.
This case was followed in 1857 by Commonwealth v. .Newton, 1
Grant 453, where an attorney was stricken from the roll for con-
tempt, in not appearing as a witness before the judge of the Com-
mon Pleas, sitting as commissioner under a rule of court. The
case came up on certiorari, the propriety of which was not ques-
tioned. WOODWARD, J., citing and approving Bummel and Bis-
choff's Case, and the Pennsylvania Act of June 13th 1836, relative
to contempts of court, showed that in the case before the court, the
Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction, and its proceedings
were most unwarrantable. The so-called contempt was not a con-
tempt of the court which assumed to punish it, and the punishment
was one which could not have been inflicted for that offence, either
by the court or the judge sitting as commissioner.
The language of the opinion is very clear and forcible: "What-
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ever doubts were raised by Austin's Case, 5 Rawle 191
(1835), and MeLaughlin's Case, 5 W. & S. 272 (1843), as to the
right of this court to review the action of inferior tribunals in sus-
pending members of the bar from practice, there is no ground to
doubt our jurisdiction in this case, because this is a proceeding for
contempt, which is a substantive criminal offence, and of which we
take cognisance on certiorari or writ of error, in the same manner
and to the same extent we do any other public offence, for which
the courts subject to our appellate jurisdiction assume to punish a
citizen. Our jurisdiction results out of the constitution of this
court. It is not self-assumed, but is forced upon us by the
legislative imposition of powers and duties under which we sit,
and is one of the securities of the liberty of the citizen." * * *
"We do not, indeed, revise such cases on their merits." The
courts having a limited jurisdiction in contempts, every fact
found by them is to be taken as true, and every intendment is
to be made in favor of their record, if it appears to us that they
proceeded within and did not exceed their jurisdiction; but for
the purpose of seeing that their jurisdiction has not been trans-
cended, and that their proceedings, as they appear of record, have
been according to law, we possess, and are bound to exercise, a
supervisory power over the courts of this Commonwealth." The
order of the Common Pleas was annulled. Williamson's Case was
distinguished on the ground that the committal was by a court of
the United States. For an appeal in case of contempt, to the Su-
preme Court, see Tome's Appeal, 50 Penn. St. 285 (1865), in
which, however, the object was to enforce a civil remedy. In
another like proceeding the matter was brought before the Su-
preme Court on habeas corpus, and a certiorari: Commonwealth
v. Reed, 59 Penn. St. 425, (1868).
The opinion just cited discriminates between cases where it is
sought to revise the control of courts over the members of their
bar, and other cases of contempt, and the former constitute an ex-
ception to the Pennsylvania doctrine on the point under discussion.
In addition to Austin's and McLaughlin's cases, above men-
tioned, there is a similar one-Dickens's Case, 67 Penn. St. 169
',1870).
Austin's Case was before the Act of 1836, but in this case, as
well as in Dickens's, the proceedings of the Common Pleas came
before the Supreme Court by virtue of special Acts of Assembly;
CONTEIPT OF COURT.
in the first the Supreme Court being directed to take cognisance
of the matter; in the second on certiorari.
In the first, the Supreme Court decided that the act complained
of was not a contempt, and ordered the relator restored to the roll
of attorneys; in the second, citing and approving the first, that
though no contempt had been committed, the act of the appellant
was good ground for striking him from the roll, and affirmed the
order of the lower court.
McLaughlin's Case, 5 W. & S. 278 (1843), was subsequent to
the Act of 1836. The relator applied to the Supreme Court for a
mandamus to the District Court of Philadelphia to restore him to
the roll, from which he had been stricken off for contempt in mak-
ing a certain publication. The court, citing Commonwealth v.
The Judges, 1 S. & R. 187, laid down the law that if the
admission of an attorney is a judicial act, his dismission is also.
that they could give relief in neither case. Although a mandamus
had been issued to an inferior court, such as the mayor of Reading,
to restore an attorney to the roll, no case had been cited where
such a writ had issued to the Common Pleas, Exchequer or King's
Bench. "The District Court is a couit of record, and although a
subordinate, cannot be considered as an inferior court in a judicial
sense. It is an inferior court only in the same manner, and to the
same extent as the Court of Common Pleas in England is inferior
to the King's Bench, the King's Bench to the Exchequer, and all
the courts in the kingdom to the House of Lords." * * *
"Courts of record and of general jurisdiction are vested with
exclusive power to regulate the conduct of their own officers, and
in this respect their decisions are wisely put on the same footing
with that numerous class of cases which is wisely confided to the
legal discretion and judgment of the court having jurisdiction of
the subject-matter. In the case of Austin et al., 5 Rawle 191, it
required the aid of an Act of Assembly to give this court jurisdic-
tion, and this is a strong, if not conclusive, argument against the
motion." It was further remarked, "that the powers of the courts
to punish the official misconduct of their officers is expressly
reserved in the Act of June 16th 1836." The jurisdiction of the
lower court and the regularity of its proceedings were not ques-
tioned.
The opinion concludes: "that the District Court has exclusive
jurisdiction of the case under their constitutional responsibility.
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and that this court has no authority to give relief to the relator in
this or any other form, whether it be certiorari, appeal or by writ
of mandamus." See also Sanders v. Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Chan.
419; State v. White, Charlton 123. For authority for this dis-
tinction, though not so cited, see Bac. Abr., Attach. ; 2 Hawk.
Attach.; 3 Atk. 568, cited in Yates's Case, 9 Johns. 395. In
the cases of In re Greevy, 4 W. N. C. 308, and .Ex parte Stein-
man, 8 Id. 296 (1880), it was attempted to establish an exception
to the doctrine of McLaughlin's Case, on the ground that the
offenders, who had published in the newspapers of which they were
editors articles extremely insulting, and in the latter case grossly
libellous, of the court, were not amenable therefor in their capacity
as attorneys; but the court rejected the attempted distinction,
holding the accused liable to the fullest extent. In the case of
.EX parte Steinman, the court preferred to waive the contempt and
punish for "misbehavior in their office of attorney," as in Dick-
ens's Case, supra.
This was the decision of the courts in which the matter origin-
ated, beyond which Greevy's Case did not go, but in -Ex parte
Steinman, on writ of error to the Supreme Court, it was over-
turned and the relators restored to their offices: 9 Weekly Notes
of Cases 145.
Since the Pennsylvania law was settled by the above-cited cases,
prior to Ex parte Steinman, it has been greatly changed by the
7th sect. of the 1st art. of the constitution of 1874, and the Act
of Assembly May 19th 1879, Pamph. L. 66. The first of these
prohibits conviction for publications as to official conduct of public
officers, &c., where not made negligently or maliciously. In
Steinman's Case, SHARSWOOD, C. J., declared: "It would be a
clear infraction of the spirit, if not the letter, of this article to
hold that an attorney can be summarily disbarred for the publica-
tion of a libel on a man in a public capacity, or where the matter
was proper for public investigation or information;. for a man cer-
tainly does not forfeit his rights as a freeman by becoming an
attorney:" p. 147. Nor in view of this article of the constitution,
and of the fact that the judiciary is now elective, and the proper
remedy for their misconduct is an appeal to the people, did the act
of the complainants constitute "misbehavior in office," for which
an attorney may be disbarred. The Act May 19th 1879 gives a
writ of error from the Supreme Court to any attorney against
"CONTEMPT OF COURT.
whom proceedings have been had in any court for unprofessional
conduct as an officer of such court, and requires the Supreme
Court "to review the same de novo." It "gives this court juris-
diction to review the discretion of the court below, and we think it
was not in this case wisely exercised :" p. 148. Even prior to the
constitution of 1874, and under the ruling in Austin's Case, the
motives of the libellous publication in this case were not such as
to constitute it a breach of professional duty: p. 148. There is a
similar provision in the constitution of Illinois: Storey v. People,
79 Ill. 45 (1875). The views of the court were much the same as
in Steinman's Case.
In Indiana and Illinois there has been a wide departure from
the English doctrine, which was followed in the early cases of
State v. Tipton, 1 Blackford 166, and Clark v. People, Breese
266.
In Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196 (1871), State v. Tipton was
overruled, and it was settled that under the Code of Indiana an
appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment of a circuit court
committing for contempt, was prescribed by the Code, it being a
final judgment in a criminal case. The power to punish for con-
tempt in Indiana is conferred on the courts by statute. Cases
where the judgment of the committing court comes collaterally, as
on habeas corpus, before the examining court, are distinguished
from those where judgments come up for direct examination on
writ of error or appeal. The court cited and followed Common-
wealth v. NZewton and Hummel and Bisehoff's Case, People v.
Hackley and other New York cases, and then proceeded "to
determine whether the conduct of the appellant constituted a
contempt of court," "and whether the court acted within or
exceeded its jurisdiction," and decided "that the court erred in
finding the appellant guilty of contempt on the evidence."
In this case was cited Stuart v. Commonwealth, 3 Scam. 395
(1842), where a very similar decision was made under the statutes
of Illinois, and Clark v. People was distinguished. See also
Storey v. People, 79 Ills. 45 (1875).
The law in New York, as established by Yates's Oase, 9 Johns
395, has been but little changed by statute, which, as the cases
from that state above cited show, is in accord with it. The
statute provides an appeal in such cases. See People v.
Jacobs, 5 Hun 428 (1875). An exception to the general
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principle has been recently set up in People ex rel., t., v. Ke'ly,
24 N. Y. 74 ; s. c. 1 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 584 (1861).
This was a commitment for contempt in refusing to answer
before a grand jury, by the Court of General Sessions of New
York city. The case came up to the Court of Errors and Appeals
on appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court on a writ of
habeas corpus, remanding the relator, and also on an appeal from
the judgment of that court dismissing a certiorari to the Court of
General Sessions; the object of both being the same, tb test the
legality of the imprisonment.
DENIO, J. : "As a general rule, the propriety of a commitment
for contempt is not examinable in any other court than the one by
which it was awarded. This is especially true where the proceed-
ing by which it is sought to be questioned is a writ of habeas
corpus, as the question on the validity then arises collaterally and
not by way of review." * * * "But the conduct charged as
contempt must be such that spme degree of delinquency or
misbehavior can be predicated of it, for if the act be plainly
indifferent or meritorious, or if it be only the assertion of the
undoubted right of the party, it will not become a criminal
contempt by being adjudged to be so. The question whether
the offender really committed the act charged will be conclu-
sively determined by the order or judgment of the court; and
so with equivocal acts, which may be culpable or innocent accord-
ing to the circumstances; but where the act is necessarily inno-
cent or justifiable, it would be preposterous to hold it a cause of
imprisonment."
If the refusal to answer was only the assertion of a constitu-
tional right, the commitment for contempt was illegal, "and the
error was certainly reached by the certiorari, if not examinable on
the return to the habeas corpus."
Very similar to this language is the remark of EIMLE, C. J., in
Re Fernandez, 10 Com. B. (N. S.) 82, respecting Bushel's Case,
supra, which he characterizes as "a most unconstitutional commit-
ment of a jury."
In a note to People v. Kelly, reported in the American Law
Register, by Professor Dwight, he states the principle established
in the Lord Mayor's, Kearney's, and Williamson's Cases, but holds
it inapplicable to such cases as that under consideration, and Com-
monwealth v. Newton, supra, in which, if there be no other method
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of reviewing the propriety of a conviction for contempt, it should
be examinable on habeas corpus to prevent a failure of justice.
The Commonwealth v. Newton, he remarks, was decided "as the
result of a proper construction of a state statute," which, however
true it may be, does not make this case of no authority as regards
the general principle: this is evident on examination of the case;
also, of the opinion of SERGEANT, J., in Hummel and Bischoff's
Case, &ura, and that of GIBSON, C. J., in 4 Rawle 366, cited
by him.
The ground on which Professor Dwight bases his view is, that
the principle of the Lord Mayor's Case, even if it be considered to
embrace such cases as People v. Kelly, and Commonwealth v.
Newton, should extend only to those "where the commitment is for
contempt generally. If the ground on which the adjudication was
made appeared upon the face of the return, and this was palpably
bad, the prisoner ought to be discharged. By parity of reasoning,
the court on habeas corpus should have a right to examine the re-
turn, to ascertain if it were wholly insufficient," citing the opinion
of Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East 150-1,
which fully sustains this distinction. See also In re Fernandez,
10 Com. B. (N. S.) 60.
Professor Dwight also cited z parte Bowe, 7 Cal. 175, 181,
184, and Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray 226, where the Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts held that they could, on habeas
corpus, inquire into the lawfulness of imprisonment by the House
of Representatives of Massachusetts: People v. Kelly, was cited
and approved in People v. Jacobs, 5 Hun. 428 (1875).
The decisions in California, though under the statutes of that
state, are in accord with the foregoing. In LEx parte Rowe, 7
Cal. 175, &c., a habeas corpus case, the Supreme Court held that
it is "the right and duty of this court to review the decisions of
inferior courts in cases of contempt, as well as in others," and
"that each court empowered to punish for contempt, is not the
sole and final judge in all cases of contempt," and it can be done
on appeal or certiorari: People v. O'Neil, 47 Cal., 109.
And the Supreme Court will issue a mandamus to an inferior
court to reinstate an attorney stricken off its rolls, where the pro-
ceedings were not regular: People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 148.
In Iowa the doctrine is that in absence of statute law each court
of record is the sole judge of contempt therein: -First Congrega-
VOL. X1I.-47
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tional Church v. Muscatine, 2 Iowa 69. By statute such cases can
be revised, but by certiorari only, by a higher court: Dunham v.
State, 6 Iowa 245 ; Robb v. M1cDonald, 29 Iowa 330.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina will review on the merits
the order of a Superior Court disbarring an attorney for contempt.
The proper procedure is by certiorari, in nature of a writ of error,
which the constitution of North Carolina empowers it to issue. A
mandamus would not be proper: Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202,
(1870). Formerly the only method of revision was on habeas
corpus: State v. M"ott, 4 Jones 449 (1857).
In South Carolina, on a commitment for contempt by a court
of record having jurisdiction, which is the judge of contempts
against itself, the remedy for irregularity in the proceedings, or
error in judgment, is by appeal, not habeas corpus. This was a
habeas corpus in the Supreme Court for a person committed by
,he Circuit Court: In re Stokes, 5 S. C. 71.
The action of a district court in Kansas in punishing an attor-
ney for contempt, will be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme
Court, and the question whether the act or word punished was a
contempt considered, as well as the power of the court to punish:
Be Pryor, 18 Kansas 72. This case was ruled on the authority
of Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cases 408, where the court,
whose action came under review, was a county court which is a court
of the "inferior order." See infra as to what are inferior courts.
Under the constitution and the recent code of Tennessee, the
Supreme Court has revisory jurisdiction in cases of contempt,
either on writ of error or appeal: Hundhausen v. Insurance Co.,
5 Heiskell 702, (1871); on habeas corpus, Sanders v. Metcalf,
1 Tenn. Chan. 419 (1873).
The law in Georgia has been somewhat modified from its original
strictness, and the Supreme Court has intimated that it would dis-
charge persons committed for contempt by subordinate courts
having jurisdiction in cases where there had been a "most flagrant
abuse of its discretion:" Cabot v. Yarborough, 27 Ga. 476;
Howard v. Durand, 86 Id. 346; Dobbs v. State, 55 Id. 272.
A similar tendency is manifested in the case of Ex rarte Burr,
9 Wheat. 529 (2 Cr. C. Rep. 379), supra, where the Supreme
Court of the United States, on motion for a mandamus to a Dis-
trict Court to restore an attorney stricken off its rolls for con-
tempt, though refusing the writ, and expressing doubts as to their
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power in the matter, said that whatever it was it would be exer-
cised, only when the conduct of the court below had been "grossly
irregular or flagrantly improper." It could only interpose on the
ground that the Circuit Court had clearly exceeded its powers, or
had decided erroneously on the testimony.
In Michigan it has been held in 1?omeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich.
449 (1868), citing and following People v. Sturtevant, 5 Seld.
263, that on appeal the Supreme Court had power, not to revise
every matter involved in the judgment, but to "review the deter-
mination below in respect to questions of jurisdiction, arising out
of the determination itself, or in relation to the fact of contempt,
as depending upon the question whether the terms of the writ
covered the specific act supposed to be a breach of the writ." See
also Shannon v. State, 18 Wisconsin 604.
The decisions above commented on, both English and American,
from the Lord Mayor's Case down, seem on careful consideration
to establish fully the general principles above laid down as to the
force and effect of commitments or punishments for contempt by
superior courts, that is courts of record and general jurisdiction.
A more detailed examination of the statement of these principles
may make them clearer in their various bearings, and may perhaps
bring into harmony some of the American decisions, such as that
in the People v. Kelly, at variance with the Lord Mayor's Oase,
by showing that their departure is more apparent than real.
We have seen that as regards superior courts there is .always a
presumption that their proceedings are regular and that they have
jurisdiction, neither of which matters will be examined into by
any other court on proceedings for contempt.
If, however, there is manifest on the face of the proceedings a
want of jurisdiction, if it is apparent that the court has exceeded
its jurisdiction, or has no jurisdiction, the matter would be ad-
judged coram non Judice, and the order or sentence in question
void.
In case of contempt in disobeying an order of court, if the court
had no power to make such order, disobedience to it would be no
contempt: See Yin. Abr. Contempt, c. 14, consequently the court
would have no jurisdiction to punish : Sparks v. M11artyn, Yen-
tris 1.
Precisely the converse of this is found in -Rex v. Clement, 4 B.
& Ald. 218, where the proceedings of the Court of Commissioners
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at the old Bailey, a superior court (see same case in 6 H. & N.
727), came up before the King's Bench on certiorari, and the orders
in question were pronounced to be within the power of the Court
of Commissioners. In Bickley v. Commonwealth, the higher court
held that the committing court exceeded its jurisdiction in regard
to the term of imprisonment, and discharged the prisoner. In
Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257, the jurisdiction and pro.
ceedings of the lower court were affirmed and held good, but its
judgment as to a portion of the sentence overruled, as not war-
ranted by the statute prescribing the punishment. In Ex parte
Fernandez, the examining court, the Court of Common Pleas,
held that the Court of Assize was a superior court, and that, there-
fore, its warrant, "in respect of a matter within its jurisdiction,"
was sufficient, though it set forth the contempt in general terms
only.
No more than this is requisite in the warrant or order of a supe-
rior court; but here another distinction is developed, adverted to
in several cases heretofore cited. If such warrant or order set
forth as matter constituting the contempt, that which plainly is
not a contempt, and cannot be so considered, nor held to justify
the imprisonment without a clear violation of law, then the court
before which such sentence comes for examination can do no other-
wise than hold the same illegal, and relieve from fine or impris-
onment thereunder. Exactly this occurred in Bushel's Case,
Vaughan 135, where the commitment by the Court of Sessions for
the causes set forth in the warrant was clearly illegal, and this was
one, if not the chief ground of their discharge -by the Common
Pleas. See the discussion of this case, supra, also People v. Kelly,
supra; -Ex parte Summers, 5 Ired. 149, and Lord DENMAN, C. J.,
in Carus Wilson's Case, Ad. & E. (N. S) 1015. And if the pro-
ceedings are on the face of them so grossly defective as to be void,
the person committed will be discharged on habeas corpus: Hurd
on Habeas Corpus 412; -Ex parte Kilgore, 3 Texas 247. To
this extent the jurisdiction and proceedings of a superior court can
be called in question: 2 Bishop's Crim. L., sect. 268; Mitchell's
Case, 12 Abb. Pr. 249; Wilson v. Wyoming Territory, 1 Wyo-
ming 114, 156; Vilas v. Burton, 4 Am. Law Reg. 168; Hurd
on Habeas Corpus 415, note.
The distinction in this respect between the jurisdiction of supe-
rior and that of inferior courts will be explained hereafter, set forth
